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Over the recent years, Europe has experienced a series of Islamic 
terrorist attacks. We derive conflicting theoretical expectations on 
whether such attacks increase populist Euroscepticism in the form of 
anti-immigration, anti-refugee and anti-EU sentiment. Empirically, we 
exploit plausible exogenous variation in the exposure to the 2016 Berlin 
attack in two nationally representative surveys covering multiple 
European countries. We find no evidence for a populist response to the 
terrorist attack in any of the surveyed countries. On the contrary, people 
in Germany became more positive towards the EU in the wake of the 
Berlin attack. Moreover, we find little evidence that ideology shaped the 
response to the attack. Our findings suggest that terrorist attacks are not 
met by an immediate public populist response. 
 





Recent years have seen a series of major terrorist attacks in Europe, including in cities such as 
Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Liège, London, Manchester, Marseilles, 
Nice, Paris, Stockholm and Turku. Between September 2014 and August 2017, there were an 
estimated 63 acts of ‘jihadist terrorism’ in Europe and North America that left 424 people dead 
and 1,800 injured (BBC 2017). Unsurprisingly, these attacks coincided with a sharp increase 
in the salience of terrorism among citizens. By the spring of 2017, citizens of EU member states 
identified terrorism as the top issue facing the EU (Eurobarometer 2017). But to what extent, 
if at all, do major terrorist attacks impact on public attitudes toward refugees, immigration and 
the European Union (EU)?  
This question is salient given that recent attacks coincide with two key developments. 
First, terrorist attacks like those in Paris in 2015, Berlin in 2016 and Manchester in 2017 took 
place against the backdrop of the post-2014 refugee crisis and widespread public debates in 
Europe about border security, immigration and terrorism (Krastev 2017). Though most 
perpetrators of Islamist terrorist attacks were citizens of the countries they attacked (BBC 
2017), there is evidence to suggest that the issues of terrorism and the refugee crisis have 
become entwined in the minds of voters. Indeed, 2016 survey data from ten European states 
found that most voters associated terrorism with the refugee crisis; a median of 59 per cent of 
respondents from ten European states agreed that refugees increase the likelihood that their 
country would experience terrorism, a figure that increased to over 70 per cent in states such 
as Poland and Hungary (Pew Research Center 2016).  
Second, these issues have also coincided with a general debate about the capacity of 
the EU to respond effectively to such challenges. For example, there has emerged evidence 
that a large number of voters feel dissatisfied with how the EU has responded to the refugee 
crisis, with an average of 74 per cent of respondents across ten EU member states saying that 
they disapprove with how the EU has managed the refugee crisis (Pew Research Center 2016). 
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Also, and as Figure 1 shows, the populations of Europe perceive freedom to live and work 
across the EU, the removal of borders and peace on the continent as the greatest achievements 
of the EU. On the other hand, just under two-fifths of all respondents claimed that mass 
immigration and the refugee crisis were among its greatest failures, underscoring the need to 
determine the political impact and consequences of salient terrorist attacks on European public 
opinion towards these issues. Meanwhile, populist radical right parties that are sceptical if not 
hostile toward the EU (Halikiopoulou, Nanou & Vasilopoulou 2012; Werts, Scheepers & 
Lubbers 2013) have sought to frame the refugee crisis and terrorism as part of a broader and 
existential ‘threat’ to Europe from Islam, Muslims and refugees (Zúquete 2008; Betz 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Public assessments of the five best and worst things about the EU, 10 
countries  
 
Note: Panel A shows the five greatest achievements of the EU. Panel B shows the five greatest failures 
of the EU. The countries surveyed are United Kingdom, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Spain, 
Greece, Germany, Italy and France. Data from the Chatham House Survey (CHS) in 2016-17, described 
in detail below. 
 
 These introductory observations raise the question of whether terrorist attacks increase 
public hostility toward refugees and immigration, and opposition to the European Union. This 
question is receiving growing attention in the social sciences but, so far, findings are mixed. 
While some studies suggest that terrorist attacks bolster threat perceptions, authoritarianism, 
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anti-immigration sentiment and public support for more restrictive immigration policies (e.g. 
Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede 2006), others suggest that such attacks have no 
significant effects (Castanho Silva 2018) or, in contrast, increase positive attitudes toward 
minorities and bolster interpersonal and institutional trust (Jakobsson & Blom 2014). An 
additional area that has attracted interest is contagion, namely whether any changes in public 
attitudes spillover from the country that was attacked into other states (Finseraas et al. 2011; 
Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Legewie 2013). 
Studies have also produced inconsistent results relating to the more specific question 
of whether attacks have particularly strong effects on specific ideological groups, with some 
suggesting that they encourage further polarization and others indicating that people who hold 
liberal or left-wing values are the most likely to change their attitudes after such events 
(Brouard, Vasilopoulos & Foucault 2018; Nail et al. 2009).  
Importantly, to our knowledge, no prior studies have looked at the impact of terrorist 
attacks on public attitudes towards the EU, which appears odd given how central the EU has 
been to public debates about these issues (Guild et al. 2015; Krastev 2017). While previous 
research has demonstrated that anti-immigration attitudes are an important influence on how 
people think about EU integration (Kentmen-Cin & Erisen 2017), it appears that terrorism 
might have an impact on public opinion toward the EU in two ways. Either in the aftermath of 
such attacks people might backlash against the EU, effectively blaming the organization, or 
citizens might ‘rally around’ the European project, becoming more supportive of institutions 
and authorities. Hitherto, to our knowledge, there is no empirical test of these expectations.  
In this paper, we build on and expand the state-of-the-art literature by using a quasi-
experimental research design with unique comparative survey data to investigate the effects of 
the 2016 terrorist attacks at a Christmas market in Berlin. The 2016 Berlin terrorist attack was 
committed by a follower of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and left 12 people dead 
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and 56 injured (for additional information on the European context, see Appendix A). The 
attack attracted wide-spread attention across Europe and is an ideal case to study not only how 
the German public reacted to the event, but also how the public responded in different European 
countries. 
Contrary to the claim that terrorist attacks produce an immediate negative public 
backlash to minorities and increase anti-EU sentiment, we find no systematic evidence that the 
German public changed its attitudes toward immigrants and refugees in the wake of the Berlin 
attack. Nor do we find evidence that respondents became more negative towards the EU. If 
anything, across both datasets, we find that people in Germany held more positive attitudes 
toward the EU following the attack, which is similar to a ‘rallying effect’ that has been observed 
in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the United States and elsewhere (e.g. Hetherington & 
Nelson 2003). These diverse findings confirm recent arguments that attitudes towards the EU 
should not uncritically be conflated with populist sentiments (e.g. Rooduijn 2018). In addition, 
with few exceptions, there is limited evidence for a strong heterogeneous response to the attack. 
For the other European countries, we find no strong patterns of spillover effects, i.e. that the 
event changed public sentiments towards immigrants, refugees or the European Union. 
 
Terrorism and Public Opinion  
Over the past two decades, though particularly following the 9/11 attacks in the US (e.g. 
Bonanno & Jost 2006; Hopkins 2010), there has been a growth of research that investigates the 
effects of terrorist attacks on public opinion toward immigrants and minorities, right-wing 
parties, civil liberties, social or institutional trust, or, in the case of Israel and Palestine, peace 
efforts (Davis & Silver 2004; Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2016; Mondak & Hurwitz 2012; Woods 
2011). Theoretically, this work typically draws on group-threat theory (Blumer 1958; Quillian 
1995) to explore the expectation that terrorist attacks bolster perceptions of threat to the 
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individual and collective group with implications for public attitudes and preferences, 
especially regarding ‘threatening’ out-groups. The literature on terrorism effects on mass 
publics can be divided into three relatively distinct clusters. 
The first explores the effects of terrorist attacks on aggregate shifts in public opinion. 
Drawing on the assumption that terrorism encourages feelings of threat, which in turn make 
conservatism and anti-group prejudice more likely (Caricarti et al. 2017; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005), there is evidence to suggest that attacks heighten prejudice and authoritarianism 
(Asbrock & Fritsche 2013; Lindén, Björklund & Bäckström 2018) and, by extension, increase 
negative attitudes toward immigrants, refugees and other minorities (Boomgaarden & de 
Vreese 2007; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede 2006), support for more restrictive 
immigration policies (Finseraas, Jakobsson & Kotsadam 2011), lower support for civil liberties 
(Bozzoli & Müller 2009) and encourage emotional reactions like anger, which benefit right-
wing parties (Berrebi & Klor 2008; Vasilopoulos et al. 2018).  
Drawing on such findings, we should expect to find that in the aftermath of a major 
terrorist attack there is a significant increase in negative public attitudes toward immigration 
and refugees. There is, however, no consensus regarding these effects. Other studies produce 
markedly different results, suggesting that whereas attacks increase public concern about 
terrorism they do not fundamentally change public attitudes toward immigrants (Castanho 
Silva 2018; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013), can lead to more positive attitudes toward out-
groups (Jakobsson & Blom 2014), and also increase interpersonal and institutional trust 
(Dinesen & Jæger 2013), as well as civic engagement (Wollebæk et al. 2012). These alternative 
findings would lead us to expect, in contrast, that terrorist attacks are followed by no significant 
change in public attitudes toward immigration and refugees, or even by an increase in positive 
sentiments toward these groups. 
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Related to this question is whether or not terrorist attacks also lead to a significant 
change in public attitudes toward the European Union. Remarkably, there has been very little 
research in this area. This appears striking for several reasons: first, as we have seen, the EU 
has become integral to debates about the refugee crisis, national security, borders and terrorism; 
second, it seems likely that citizens of EU member states may view such terrorist events as an 
attack on peace and security in ‘Europe’ more generally; and, third, we know that anxieties 
over perceived threats to the wider group have become a key driver of modern Euroscepticism 
(Lubbers & Jaspers 2011) and support for the radical right (Werts, Scheepers & Lubbers 2013).  
Furthermore, recently scholars such as De Vries (2018) contend that public opinion 
toward the EU is responsive to real-world events and that citizens effectively change their 
views as a result of events that reflect positively or negatively on the European level. We expect 
that terrorist attacks, which are linked in the public mind-set to the issues of the refugee crisis 
and concerns about external border security, might also have an effect. Such attacks may erode 
support for the EU and further integration, on the basis that citizens associate such threats with 
the perceived failure of EU authorities to respond effectively, or even encourage such attacks 
by opening national borders for terrorists. Conversely, such attacks might invoke perceptions 
of security and community or support offered by the European Union whereby citizens become 
more positive to the European Union. 
The latter expectation appears especially likely given research on so-called ‘rallying 
effects’ that emerge in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. In the US, studies have found that 
following a major terrorist incident, there was a substantial increase in public approval of the 
president. This is referred to as a ‘rally effect’ because of how citizens ‘rally around the flag’, 
or institutions that are seen to be symbols of national unity and/or identity (Hetherington & 
Nelson 2003; Perrin & Smolek 2009). This is traced to a tendency for citizens, amid moments 
 8 
of existential shocks, to interpret institutions like the presidency as symbols of unity, or a 
general reluctance among opposing politicians to criticize the status quo amid such moments 
of national shocks (Brody & Shapiro 1991). These rallying effects can be rational responses to 
major international crises or shocks (Colaresi 2007), with the size of such effects being heavily 
dependent on the scale of the event and how the media covers it (Baker & Oneal 2001). There 
are good reasons to expect to find that citizens might also ‘rally around’ the EU in the aftermath 
of a terrorist attack. Outside of the US, similar rallying effects have been documented in 
European states like France (e.g. Coupe 2017), Spain (Dinesen & Jæger 2013) and Sweden 
(Geys & Qari 2017), where after attacks scholars recorded an increase of public trust in 
institutions. Put simply, one might expect citizens to also perceive the EU as a broader symbol 
of unity in the wake of attacks, with popularity for the EU in Germany and across neighbouring 
member states increasing in the shadow of such a shock. 
 A second cluster concerns the question of whether the effects of terrorist attacks on 
individual-level attitudes are especially pronounced among particular ideological groups (Nail 
et al. 2009; see Brouard, Vasilopoulos & Foucault, 2018 for a helpful overview). Seen from 
the ‘Reactive Liberals’ approach, any post-terrorism shifts toward right-wing or authoritarian 
positions will be especially pronounced among citizens who hold a left-wing or liberal 
ideological orientation, not least because citizens on the right-wing already support such 
positions. Following terrorist attacks in London, Van de Vyver et al. (2016) recorded a sharp 
increase in public hostility toward Muslims among liberals, while others similarly found that 
after terrorism citizens who were initially less authoritarian became more susceptible to 
‘authoritarian thinking’ and supportive of restrictive policies (Hetherington & Suhay 2011). 
Yet these findings too are mixed. Examining the reactions to two major terrorist attacks in 
France in 2015, Castanho Silva (2018) found no overall shift in public opinion and mostly no 
significant differences between liberals’ and conservatives’ responses, although after the 
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Charlie Hebdo attack liberals turned more restrictive on refugee policy while conservatives 
became more xenophobic. 
An alternative ‘Terror Management’ approach instead suggests that heightened 
concerns about mortality lead citizens to defend themselves against this anxiety by embracing 
their pre-existing beliefs, i.e. liberals become more liberal and conservatives become more 
conservative. Fear of death leads citizens to strengthen their initial worldviews, with terrorist 
attacks producing a polarizing effect whereby groups at either end of the ideological spectrum 
‘double down’ on their pre-existing views (Castano et al. 2011; Greenberg et al. 1986; 1992; 
Schüller 2015; van Prooijen et al. 2015). Whereas citizens on the right-wing become more anti-
immigrant, anti-refugee, or anti-EU, those on the left-wing will become more positive in their 
views of immigrants, refugees and the EU (e.g. Pyszczynski, Greenberg & Solomon 1997). 
There is, however, evidence to the contrary, with Castanho Silva (2018) finding no evidence 
of these polarizing effects after the two attacks in Paris in 2015. Given these mixed findings 
further empirical evidence is needed. 
A final cluster of research investigates the extent to which, if at all, these effects 
‘spillover’ from one country to others, i.e. whether the effects of a terrorist attack remain 
confined in the ‘target’ state or whether they are also visible in other countries. Accordingly, 
public opinion in other countries might be responsive to terrorist attacks in other countries. 
Yet, existing work on ‘contagion effects’ has primarily focused on why terror attacks from 
groups of one country are followed by comparable attacks on the same target or country from 
groups of other analogous countries. Simply put, growing evidence suggests that terror attacks 
are highly unlikely to be independent of each other (Braithwaite and Li, 2007; Midlarsky et al. 
1980; Neumayer and Plumper, 2009). The nature of terrorist attacks, with the aim of spreading 
fear in the public, might for this reason travel across national borders. Accordingly, where past 
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terrorist attacks have occurred is endogenous to where future terrorist attacks will occur 
(Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Koch and Cranmer, 2007). Inter-civilizational rallying effects have 
been commonly put forward as an explanation for the spatial dependence of terrorist attacks 
(Huntington, 1996) with robust statistical evidence that rallying effects are contagious along 
these inter-civilizational lines (Neumayer and Plumper, 2010). Extending this to spatial 
proximity, others find that being near countries affected by terror attacks increases the 
likelihood of similar activity in their own country (Bloomberg and Hess, 2008; Lai, 2007). The 
‘politics of threat’ literature stresses how fear can lead citizens to become less reliant on 
longstanding political pre-dispositions and search for new information (Brader, 2006; Marcus 
et al, 2000), with the media at the forefront of not only providing cues but also affecting 
attitudes through evoking emotion (Gadarian, 2010). As such, possible spillover effects are 
rooted in the premise that amid an international news and political arena, attacks abroad can 
bolster domestic perceptions of threat, leading to shifts in public attitudes and preferences even 
in states that experience no such attacks.  
Research on the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (Castanho Silva 2018) found little 
evidence of public opinion change on immigration and refugee issues in the target country of 
France but did find a significant rise of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment in other EU 
member states, especially those with higher unemployment and lower education. After the 
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, Finseraas et al. (2011) found large country-
variation among Europeans while further work by Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) found effects 
after the 2008 Mumbai bombings. Legewie (2013) studied the impact of the terror attack in 
Bali on October 2002 on anti-immigration attitudes in nine European countries. The results 
showed cross-national variation in the effect of the terrorist attack on public opinion. Overall, 
while the findings are mixed, and while there are particular reason to believe that terrorist 
attacks in the context of the refugee crisis might shape public opinion in European countries 
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beyond the target country, additional evidence is needed to shed light on the possible spillover 
effects on populist sentiments across Europe.   
Context and Hypotheses 
Based on the literature, we will derive specific, and in some cases contradicting, hypotheses by 
connecting the theoretical perspectives with the case of the 2016 Berlin attack. The Berlin 
attack took place on 19 December 2016 when an Islamic terrorist drove a truck into a Christmas 
market and left 12 people dead and 56 injured. The attack followed a number of other important 
events in Germany; the arrival of more than one million refugees and migrants in 2015; the rise 
of the populist radical right AfD, which won seats in most state parliaments and in 2017 secured 
more than ninety seats in the Bundestag; and several other terrorist incidents, including an 
arson and knife attack in Hanover in February 2016, a bombing in Essen in April 2016, the 
Würzburg train axe attack in July 2016, and a suicide bombing in Ansbach in July 2016. The 
subsequent Berlin attack was the most significant terrorist attack in Germany, in terms of 
casualties, since the discovery of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Underground (NSU) in 2011. 
 As we have seen, there is evidence from both the US and Europe that terrorist attacks 
can result in a significant increase in institutional trust (Dinesen & Jaeger 2013; Wollebaek et 
al. 2012). Such evidence though is confined to the impact on national institutions with few, if 
any, insights into how negative events such as terrorist attacks impact support for supra-
national bodies. Our first hypothesis is that the terrorist attack will increase support for the EU 
in Germany. 
 
H1 (institutional effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely lead to a significant rise in 
public support among Germans for the EU. 
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 It is also possible to expect, however, that an increase in threat perceptions will erode 
public support for the EU and further integration on the basis that citizens will ‘hunker down’ 
when faced with threatening events, reverting to their local community during moments of 
threat while blaming the EU for the perceived lack of security at the EU level. In other words, 
the Berlin terror attack might have led to an increased focus on the global threat of terrorism 
and encouraged opposition to the EU, which is seen as delivering an inadequate or weak 
response to this perceived threat.  
 
 H2 (national threat effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely to lead to a significant 
drop in public support among Germans for the EU.  
 
 As outlined above, increased threat and terrorist activity has been found to generate a 
significant increase in prejudice and negative attitudes toward immigrants and other perceived 
out-groups, such as refugees (Caricarti et al. 2017; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede 
2006). The increased support and legitimisation of political elites on the populist right has led 
to the politicisation of narratives and a hardening in rhetoric linking German policies towards 
immigration and refugees to terrorism. This is mirrored elsewhere in the EU where, as noted 
at the outset, large numbers of voters see a link between terrorism and the refugee crisis. Our 
third and fourth hypothesis provides competing expectations to address the existing literature: 
 
H3 (in-group effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely to reduce public support for 
immigration and refugees.  
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H4 (interpersonal trust effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely to leave public 
support for immigration and refugees unchanged or lead to an increase in positive 
attitudes. 
 
 Alternatively, there is evidence that following a terrorist attack, public opinion not only 
drifts to the right but any re-positioning is likely to be far more prominent among those on the 
left of the spectrum (Van de Vyver et al. 2016). This has been contested with some scholars 
arguing that a terrorist act could result in a shift to the left with increased support for addressing 
the root causes of terrorism – poverty; political oppression; ethnic conflict; state failure – and 
in some cases reflecting narratives around how Western governments have exacerbated the 
problem (Caruso & Schneider 2011; Krieger & Meierrieks 2011). As a consequence, we might 
expect to see ideology shape how people respond to the terrorist attack in Berlin. We therefore 
put forward the following two hypotheses: 
 
H5 (terror management effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely to give left-wing 
(right-wing) people more left-wing (right-wing) attitudes.  
 
H6 (reactive liberals effect): The Berlin terrorist attack is likely to shift left-wing people 
to more right-wing attitudes. 
 
 Next, we address whether the Berlin attack had a significant impact on attitudes towards 
the EU, immigration and refugees across different EU countries. There is evidence that the 
effects of terrorism on public attitudes can ‘spillover’, across national borders. However, such 
effects are small, with the average effect concealing cross-national heterogeneity. As such, 
treatment effects are often confined to a few countries (Finseraas et al. 2011).  
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 Yet the preponderance of recent terrorist attacks across Europe, particularly in countries 
which share borders with Germany, could result in malaise restricting any ‘spillover’ impact. 
Alternatively, the increasing accessibility of media outlets and the way in which hostility to the 
EU, anti-immigrant, anti-refugee narratives are politicised by local elites and contextualised to 
their respective electorate may be key in driving shifts in public opinion to these issues outside 
Germany. Furthermore, outside of Germany, it is also necessary to examine whether the Berlin 
attack entrenched ideological identification or whether any repositioning was more prominent 
among individuals on the left of the ideological spectrum as public opinion moved to the right. 
We therefore put forward the following hypotheses: 
 
H7 (spillover: direct effect): Outside Germany, there will be a backlash against 
immigrants, refugees and increasing hostility to the EU in countries. 
 
H8 (spillover: terror management effect): Outside Germany, the Berlin terrorist attack 
is likely to give left-wing (right-wing) people more left-wing (right-wing) attitudes.  
 
H9 (spillover: reactive liberals effect): Outside Germany, the Berlin terrorist attack is 




We address the gaps and puzzles in the extant research noted above by utilizing two quasi-
experiments, including a new and unique survey. This enables us to consider the effects of 
terrorist attacks on public attitudes toward minorities and the EU as well as the extent to which 
any effects ‘spillover’ to other countries. The two datasets allow us to assess whether a pattern 
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identified in one dataset replicates or is unique to the specific sample (for a similar approach, 
see Legewie 2013). Specifically, we use a quasi-experimental research design and two survey 
data sources. The datasets were collected in Germany as well as other European countries 
surrounding the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack. These datasets make it possible to not only study 
how the public in Germany reacted to the event, but also to assess whether any ideological 
shifts in position towards the populist right following this attack was evident in neighbouring 
EU member states.  
 Our first data source is the Chatham House Survey (CHS), commissioned by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House and fielded by Kantar between December 
2016 and February 2017. The online survey is a representative sample of 10,195 respondents 
aged over 18 using age, gender and geographical quotas. Respondents were sampled in ten 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the 
UK) with the purpose of examining public opinion towards the EU, domestic politics, and 
major recent political events in European politics. Our second data source is the 2016 European 
Social Survey (ESS) which uses an established face to face approach and adheres to 
longstanding random probability protocols to ensure representativeness and within country 
capture. 
 Importantly, in both surveys, the data collection took place when the 2016 Berlin attack 
unfolded. This results in a sample of respondents where some were exposed to the terrorist 
attack whereas others were not. Specifically, the group of respondents interviewed before the 
Berlin terrorist attack serves as an approximate counterfactual group for the respondents 
interviewed afterwards. In other words, we can compare the people interviewed before and 
after and attribute systematic differences across the two datasets to the terrorist attack.  
 We exploit that the sampling frame and the collection of the two datasets are unrelated 
to the Berlin attack in 2016. Increasingly, scholars have relied on the assumption that when a 
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respondent is interviewed this is time independent from when an unexpected event occurs. As 
such an unexpected event like a terrorist attack naturally assigns respondents into a treatment 
and control group, assuming ignorability and excludability tests are met, scholars can obtain 
causal estimates of unexpected shocks (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno & Hernández 2018). Such 
designs have the advantage of providing internal validity through the as-if random assignment, 
external validity given the reach and representativeness of the survey, and ecological validity 
by studying the impact of real-world events.  
 Our comparative design enables us to test whether the attack had an impact in Germany 
as well as in other European countries. Alongside Germany, we selected countries from the 
two datasets with more than 50 observations before and after the day of the Berlin attack in 
December. Table 1 shows the countries selected and a breakdown of respondents sampled 
before and after. The table also shows that we have Germany and France included in both of 
the datasets, whereas the other countries are unique to the specific dataset. Last, ESS also 
included data for Israel, but as we focus solely on the European context here, we excluded this 
country (the results for this particular sample are reported in Appendix K).  
 
Table 1: Respondents interviewed before and after the Berlin attack 
 CHS ESS 
 Before After Before After 
Germany 692 126 359 115 
France 566 183 638 137 
Austria 769 140   
Belgium 602 158   
Greece 688 244   
Hungary 759 210   
Poland 777 55   
Spain 772 70   
Estonia   422 143 
Israel   384 178 
Netherlands     175 55 
Poland   488 164 
Note: For additional information on the data, see Appendix B and C. 
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 To ensure that there are no observable differences that will bias the results, we ran 
balance tests on the data and additional robustness tests taking any observable differences into 
account. As relevant covariates available in both datasets, we included gender, age, income, 
employment status, education and left-right ideology. Figure 2 provides the statistical tests for 
imbalances on the covariates in the datasets. In both datasets, people interviewed after the event 
in Germany are on average younger. While we found imbalances on some of the covariates in 
the datasets, none of these differences are replicated across any of the datasets in Germany and 
France. Overall, we found no severe data challenges or violations during testing on how the 
public reacted to the terrorist attack across the two datasets. Noteworthy, as discussed below, 
results from additional robustness tests for Germany, including replications using repeated 
cross-sectional and panel data, add further credibility to the main findings. 
 
Figure 2: Balance tests for observable differences, CHS and ESS 
 
 Note: The dots indicate P-values from simple mean difference tests. Dashed line indicates p = 0.05. For 
full question wording on all covariates, see Appendix B. For descriptive statistics on all variables, see 
Appendix C.  
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 To conduct the empirical tests, we use five dependent variables to measure attitudes 
towards the EU, seven dependent variables to examine public attitudes towards immigration, 
and four dependent variables to determine attitudes toward refugees. For the EU, the outcome 
variables include accession of new countries, enlargement, unification and support for more 
powers. On immigration, we cover a broad range of established measures including a generic 
question about whether immigration is good for the country, cultural and economic measures, 
impact on welfare and crime. Reflecting the salience of the refugee crisis we incorporate a 
measure to capture positive or negative feelings towards refugees entering your country, 
attitudes towards applicability and risk and whether refugees should be allowed families to join 
them.  
 The use of two data sources not only provides us with a rich set of questions for each 
issue but acts as a robustness check. For instance, in the case of the EU, we employ different 
measures worded slightly differently on the CHS and ESS to capture integration - unification 
or a so-called United States of Europe. Here we can determine if we get similar responses in 
Germany and across other EU countries. All measures are coded to greater values showing 
more positive attitudes towards the EU, refugees and immigration. To ease the substantial 
interpretation across measures, all variables are further rescaled to go from 0 to 1. Full details 
of the questions and scales of each variable used to measure these issues and descriptive 
statistics are provided in Appendix B and C. To look into a heterogeneous response in the 
public (for H5, H6, H8 and H9), our key variable of interest is ideology which is measured 
using an 11-point scale (extreme left = 0; extreme right = 10) on both the CHS and ESS. This 
variable captures important differences in the public on how their political outlook and might 
shape the response to the attack.  
 
 19 
Results: The Effects of a Terrorist Attack on Public Opinion 
In order to test our first four hypotheses, we look into the effects of the Berlin attack on public 
opinion in Germany. Figure 3 shows the effect of the attack on all outcomes of interest. The 
estimates are from OLS regressions with no controls included in the left panel and gender, age, 
income, education, employment status and left-right ideology as controls in the right panel. For 
the attitudes towards the European Union, we see that people hold more positive attitudes after 
the attack. All estimates are positive and show that people became between five and ten 
percentage points more positive towards the EU after the terrorist attack in both samples. Thus, 
the evidence is in line with a positive effect as proposed by H1 and not a national threat 
response proposed by H2. We find no evidence that people blamed the European Union, or 




Figure 3: The effect of the Berlin attack on public opinion in Germany, OLS estimates 
 
Note: Positive effects indicate more positive attitudes towards the EU, immigration and refugees. The thick lines 
indicate 90% confidence intervals and then thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. All models are OLS 
regressions controlling for gender, age, income, education, employment status and ideology. For full question 
wordings, see Appendix B. For the exact estimates, see Appendix E. For similar models using full matching, see 
Appendix F. 
 
Turning to H3 and H4, for the outcomes related to immigration and refugees, we 
generally do not find systematic evidence that the public changed its attitudes in the wake of 
the Berlin terrorist attacks. While there are individual outcomes that reach statistical 
significance, the overall trend shows no significant changes in public attitudes towards 
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more positive towards the European Union in the wake of the terrorist attack but did not change 
their opinions towards immigration and refugees.  
To account for potential imbalances on the covariates, we reproduced the models above 
using full matching. We found similar findings to the ones presented here (full details are 
available in Appendix F). Next, country-level fixed effects models (Appendix D) and 
additional test for differences between Germany and the rest of Europe (Appendix I) confirm 
the findings. To replicate the findings presented above, we used multiple cross-sectional 
datasets from Eurobarometer and panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study 
(available in Appendix L). Lastly, and as made available in the replication material, estimates 
from ordered logit regressions show similar effects.  
Next, to shed light on whether people reacted differently to the attack (H5 and H6), we 
turn to the heterogeneous response of the attack in Germany. Figure 4 shows a series of 
estimates from OLS regressions with interactions where we estimate the extent to which people 




Figure 4: Interaction tests for an ideological response to the terrorist attack, Germany 
 
Note: The estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients for the interaction terms. The thick lines indicate 
90% confidence intervals and then thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. For the full models, see 
Appendix G. 
 
In general, we find no convincing evidence that respondents reacted in a strong and 
ideological manner across the board. Respondents who held either left-wing or right-wing 
ideological outlooks responded in the same way to the terrorist attack, including the outcomes 
where there was no change. As such, we find no evidence of a terror management effect (H5) 
or a reactive liberals effect (H6). One noteworthy exception is whether people believe the 























































find a polarizing dynamic. Figure 5 shows the marginal effects of the attack at different levels 
of left-right ideology. 
 
Figure 5: Marginal effect of attack on attitudes towards applications for refugee status 
 
Note: Marginal effect of the terrorist attack at different levels of ideology. Positive values indicate positive 
attitudes towards applications for refugee status. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. For the full 
model, see Table G.3 in Appendix G.   
 
For people with a left-wing ideology, the attack had a positive impact, i.e. made people 
more likely to support that the government should be generous in judging people’s applications 
for refugee status. For people with a right-wing ideology, on the other hand, the attack had a 
negative impact and made people less likely to support the notion of generosity. Overall, this 
polarizing effect suggests that people are entrenching their pre-existing beliefs in line with the 
terror management hypothesis. However, again, this is solely for one of the outcomes, but on 
a methodological aside it shows the importance of looking beyond the average or direct effect 

































Results: Spillover effects across Europe 
Was there a backlash against immigrants, refugees and increasing hostility to the EU in 
countries outside Germany? Here we examine how the Berlin attack shaped public opinion 
across Europe (H7). Figure 6 shows estimates from Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Netherlands, Poland and Spain. The empirical approach is identical to the models 




Figure 6: Spillover effects across Europe, OLS estimates 
 
Note: Positive effects indicate more positive attitudes towards the EU, immigration and refugees. The thick lines 
indicate 90% confidence intervals and then thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. All models control for 
gender, age, income, education, employment status and ideology. For full question wordings, see Appendix B. 
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 Overall, there is no trend towards changes in the different outcomes in the nine 
countries. In France, the country where we have data from both the CHS and ESS, there is no 
indication that the European public responded to the German terrorist attack. While some might 
suggest that this is because France had already experienced major terrorist attacks prior to the 
Berlin attack, for the other countries, while there are cases where we see changes in public 
opinion, these changes do not replicate across different measures and, in general, might be 
attributed to statistical noise and no systematic changes. In other words, we do not find strong 
support of any ‘spillover effect’ on public attitudes in the other EU member states surveyed 
here following the Berlin attack in Germany (H7). 
However, it might be that these effects are hiding strong political responses in some of 
the countries, e.g. a polarization effect as for attitudes towards applications for refugee status 
in Germany. To see whether there was an ideological response in the different countries (H8 




Figure 7: Interaction tests for an ideological response to the terrorist attack, Europe 
 
Note: The estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients for the interaction terms. The thick lines indicate 
90% confidence intervals and then thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
   
Generally, we find little evidence that the missing spillover effects are due to a 
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is Belgium where some of the interactions for the outcomes related to refugees and immigrants 
are significant (see Appendix J for the marginal effects). These effects show that people on the 
left became more positive towards immigration and refugees whereas the effect became smaller 
or negative for right-wing people. While we are unable to shed light on why these patterns 
arise, one explanation might be that Belgium not only shares a border with Germany but has 
itself suffered numerous terrorist atrocities in recent times. Clearly, the same applies to France, 
where we find no such effects, and so it appears that additional research is required into 
understanding when and why such spillover effects occur. In sum, the evidence provides little 
to no support for H7-H9, i.e. that the terrorist attack in Berlin had important spillover effects 
across Europe. In summary, therefore, we have shed further light on how citizens respond to 
terrorist attacks and in Table 2 we present an overview of our findings alongside information 
on whether or not we confirm the hypotheses. 
 
Table 2: Summary of hypotheses and findings 
Hypothesis Confirmed Note 
1 Institutional effect Yes Greater support for the EU in Germany 
2 National threat effect No No systematic evidence  
3 In-group effect No No systematic evidence 
4 Interpersonal trust effect Partially No changes in attitudes towards 
immigrants and refugees 
5 Terror management 
effect 
Partially An effect on specific outcome 
6 Reactive liberals effect No No systematic evidence 






Partially For three outcomes (one refugee item; 
two immigrant items) in one country 
(Belgium) 
9 Spillover (Reactive 
Liberals effect) 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Do terrorist attacks such as the Berlin attack in 2016 encourage negative public attitudes toward 
refugees, immigrants and other minorities, as well as the EU? This question has become 
increasingly resonant as EU member states have grappled with terrorist attacks, a major refugee 
crisis and strong public support for populist radical right parties, which are often sceptical if 
not openly hostile toward the EU. To explore this question and disentangle the causal dynamics 
of how citizens respond to terrorist attacks, we utilized two innovative quasi-experiments to 
contribute to and expand the existing literature. Our research design allowed us to formulate 
and test nine hypotheses on how citizens might react in the shadow of a major terrorist attack. 
 Our contribution to the extant literature is four-fold. First, by looking at the EU we are 
able to replicate the positive effect on institutional evaluations from previous studies at the EU 
level. This shows that, contrary to claims in the wider debate, most citizens do not ‘blame’ the 
EU for Islamist terrorist attacks. Rather, our findings suggest that citizens tend to ‘rally’ around 
the EU after such attacks and so may be open to EU-wide solutions. This is, to our knowledge, 
the first evidence on how terrorism matter for EU attitudes. 
Second, we also contribute directly to the debate on whether the public becomes more 
or less hostile towards immigration and refugees in the wake of terrorism. Again, contrary to 
popular claims we find no systematic evidence for such change. Third, we add new insights to 
the heterogeneous response to terrorist attacks. Specifically, the results show that the public 
response to terrorism is not always shaped by people’s ideological outlook but can, in some 
cases, explain no average effect in the public. Fourth, we address the literature on the spillover 
effects of terrorism on public opinion. Our findings suggest that, at least in the short term, the 
European public do not react strongly to terrorist attacks that are perpetrated in other countries. 
Furthermore, our use of two different datasets to shed light on these dynamics provides 
a more robust test of how public opinion changed in the wake of a major attack. This not only 
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provides strong internal validity but also allows for the replication of key findings. However, 
there are three limitations in our approach and which future research would do well to address.  
First, this is a single-case study conducted to speak to a broader literature interested in 
the impact of terrorism on public opinion. As illustrated in Appendix A, it is possible that the 
estimates are affected by the context of prior terrorist attacks with German attitudes remaining 
relatively stable because by December 2016 they had become used to such terrorist incidents.  
Second, one of the limitations of our data is that we are unable to address the key 
psychological mechanisms that drive preference updating. We know that public opinion on 
these issues is heavily affected by emotional states (see Huddy et al. 2002; Lerner et al. 2003), 
that fear can lead to a shift in ideological identification and support for authoritarian policies 
(e.g. Huddy et al. 2007; Vasilopoulos et al. 2017) and that risk propensity can play a key role 
in shaping public attitudes toward the EU (Clarke et al. 2017; Steenbergen and Siczek 2017). 
Also, the role of elite cues, whether from politicians or media, has not been investigated due to 
data limitations. It is worth noting, for example, that in the aftermath of the Berlin attack much 
of the public debate focused on failures by security agencies that had put the perpetrator under 
surveillance but failed to arrest him.i Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel was widely criticized by 
the populist radical right Alternative for Germany, a highly stigmatized party, which might 
have encouraged citizens to rally around anti-AfD positions. Unfortunately, the data did not 
contain measures that would otherwise allow us to address the moderating or mediating role of 
psychological mechanisms and elite cues.  
Similarly, we are unable to determine whether our results reflect the dual process model 
of political behaviour where individuals who store latent internalised negative stereotypes 
strive, when triggered by contextual signals and events, to act or adhere to anti-prejudice norms 
(Blinder et al. 2013). While we provide distinct theoretical expectations and demonstrate which 
hypotheses are confirmed, there are alternative micro-level mechanisms that we cannot account 
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for or determine in the present context. Accordingly, future research will have to delve more 
into the different causal mechanisms that connect salient terrorist attacks with public opinion 
dynamics. These would unquestionably be fruitful avenues for further research. 
Third, while our data allows us to address the impact of the Berlin attack in Germany, 
spillover effects beyond its borders and competing hypotheses around ideological positioning, 
the cross-sectional nature of the data and the sample size restricts our ability to examine change 
over time and determine whether such effects (or non-effects) are temporal or long-lasting. 
Similarly, while the breadth and depth of questions on Europe, immigration and refugees is a 
strength of the data this is also only available for ten countries which does restrict our ability 
to take account of contextual mechanisms through hierarchical or multilevel modelling. Future 
research would do well, for example, to explore the role of elite cues amid an approach that 
can also systematically take the broader context into account. 
Importantly, other potential contextual narratives and moderators could not be 
examined and should be the focus of further research. In truth, it remains the case that to date 
no studies have been able to combine the time, panel element, multilevel structure, the depth 
and breadth of questions on salient issues alongside capturing precise measures at both the 
individual and aggregate level to precisely determine the underlying mechanisms necessary to 
provide a comprehensive insight into the impact of terrorist events on public opinion dynamics. 
Such data is imperative moving forward so that more sophisticated techniques such as dynamic 
structural equation modelling or multilevel mixture models can be applied to address these 
outstanding questions. Through such techniques, we would be able to monitor latent variable 
development across time, pinpoint shifts earlier which can have a bearing on how respondents 
react to such events whilst simultaneously through the multilevel structure account for cluster 
specific class or group distributions which would provide a deeper insight into potential 
variations in spillover across different settings.  
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Putting limitations to one side, the findings of our study have implications for the 
broader understanding of European politics in the wake of a major refugee crisis. The finding 
that public opinion becomes more positive toward the EU in the wake of terrorist attacks 
challenges the argument that these attacks will only benefit populist radical right parties, or 
that the refugee crisis will inevitably erode public support for the EU (Krastev 2017). There is 
a temptation in the wider debate to link such attacks to broader trends in Europe, including the 
electoral growth of anti-immigration parties, negative public reactions to refugees and rising 
rates of electoral volatility, but our findings challenge these narratives. Our study also points 
to opportunities for the EU to garner public support for a revised approach to bolstering internal 
and external security measures, taking advantage of the ‘rally effect’ that we identify, and 
which is consistent with findings in the US. While public support for Eurosceptic movements 
is likely to remain on the landscape for many years to come, our findings also point to the need 
to develop a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between this support and terrorism 
and warn against the assumption that terrorism will inevitably lead to a more exclusionary 
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